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Abstract 
Warning messages are one of the last lines of defense in information security, and are 
fundamental to users’ security interactions with technology. Unfortunately, research 
shows that users routinely ignore security warnings. A key contributor to this disregard 
is habituation, the diminishing of attention through frequent exposure. However, 
previous research has examined habituation indirectly by observing its influence on 
security behavior, rather than measuring habituation itself. 
We contribute by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to directly 
observe habituation as it occurs in the brain. Our results show that with repeated 
exposure to warnings, neural activity in the visual processing centers sharply 
decreases. We also show that this process occurs for images of both security warnings 
and general software applications, although habituation is more severe for security 
warnings. Our findings suggest that habituation is not due to users’ laziness or 
carelessness, but is a natural consequence of how the brain works. 
Keywords:  Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), NeuroIS, behavioral 
information system security, habituation 
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Introduction 
Warning messages are one of the last lines of defense in computer security and are fundamental to users’ 
security interactions with technology. Accordingly, researchers have actively sought to understand how 
users interact with security warnings and why warnings are so pervasively ignored (Bravo-Lillo et al. 
2011). A key contributor to the disregard of security warnings is habituation, which is the diminishing of 
attention because of frequent exposure to warnings (Kalsher and Williams 2006). While habituation 
allows people to tune out unnecessary stimuli—helpful in maintaining attention on the task at hand—
habituation to warnings can lead to severe negative consequences (Schechter et al. 2007; Sharek et al. 
2008). Through this phenomenon, warnings that once were salient become virtually unnoticeable. 
Although habituation has been inferred as a factor in many security warning studies (e.g., Schechter et al. 
2007; Egelman et al. 2008; Sunshine et al. 2009), little research has specifically investigated habituation. 
In addition, research that examines habituation in the context of security warnings has done so indirectly 
by observing the influence of habituation on security behavior rather than by measuring habituation itself 
(Bravo-Lillo et al. 2013; Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón 2007). Therefore, a pressing need is to 
understand how habituation to security warnings occurs in order to create interventions that can mitigate 
the effects of habituation. 
This study makes a first step in addressing this gap by using neuroscience to open the “black box” of the 
brain to observe habituation as it occurs (Dimoka et al. 2011). In doing so, we respond to the call of 
Crossler et al. (2013) for the application of NeuroIS methods to yield fresh insights into information 
security behaviors. Accordingly, we point to the repetition suppression (RS) effect, the reduction of neural 
responses to stimuli that are repeatedly viewed (Grill-Spector et al. 2006) as the neurological 
manifestation of habituation (Kandel 2001). By investigating how RS occurs in the brain, we can enhance 
our understanding of the phenomenon of habituation, thereby supporting future efforts to design security 
warnings that are resistant to habituation. Accordingly, the research questions for this study are threefold: 
RQ1. Does RS occur when participants view security warnings?  
RQ2. What areas of the brain exhibit RS in response to security warnings? 
RQ3. How does RS occur for security warnings as opposed to general software applications? 
We investigate these questions by conducting a laboratory experiment using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Our results show that with repeated exposure to warnings, neural activity in 
the visual processing center of the brain (the occipital lobe) sharply decreases. This neurobiological 
process directly leads to the effects of habituation. We also show that the RS effect occurs in a similar way 
for both images of security warnings and general software applications, suggesting that the RS effect is 
pervasive across computing tasks. 
This study makes three primary contributions. First, we show using evidence from fMRI that habituation 
to security warnings is an unconscious, obligatory process that results in significantly diminished 
attention after only the second warning exposure, and dropping off even further with successive viewings. 
While previous research has understood habituation as an automatic response, our research is the first to 
show empirically how habituation occurs in the brain over time. 
Second, we make a methodological contribution by linking the neurological phenomenon of RS to 
habituation to security warnings, providing a direct means of measuring habituation to security warnings 
in the brain. With this measure, researchers can test security warning designs that are effective in 
reducing habituation in the brain. Therefore, this research represents the initial step towards this goal. 
Third, we demonstrate how habituation is different for security warnings as compared to other 
phenomena, viz., general software applications. We show that although the rate of decline of visual 
attention is similar for both types of images, general software application screenshots elicit significantly 
higher activity in the visual processing regions, even after controlling for image size dimensions. We also 
show in our test of H3 that brain regions associated with fear and anxiety show greater activity for 
security warnings, than for general software applications. Overall, our findings imply that the occurrence 
of habituation is more severe for security warnings. 
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We expect that the increased understanding gained through this study will support future research 
examining habituation of security warnings. Additionally, we expect that our findings will allow 
researchers to use measurements of the RS effect to guide the development and testing of security 
warnings that are resistant to habituation and thus lead to more secure behavior than for general software 
applications. 
Literature Review 
Security Warnings 
A mature body of research has investigated warnings in the physical world by examining how they are 
processed and what makes them more or less effective (Wogalter 2006a, Witte 1992). Likewise, in the last 
10 years, an active research stream has examined the effectiveness of a variety of computer security 
warnings. As in the physical world, computer security warnings are not ideal as a primary means of 
defense because they do not in themselves reduce the likelihood or severity of a threat (Wogalter 2006b). 
Nonetheless, warnings play an important role in (1) informing, (2) reminding, and (3) persuading 
recipients to take safe actions (Kalsher and Williams 2006). Moreover, warnings are crucial in situations 
in which threats cannot be designed away, such as when contextual decisions are required (Bravo-Lillo et 
al. 2011). 
Unfortunately, experimental research has consistently shown that security warnings are largely ineffective 
(Wu et al. 2006). Dhamija et al. (2006) found that 68 percent of participants ignored or clicked-through 
browser SSL warnings without hesitation and that only 4 percent of participants can recall the language of 
SSL warnings. Similarly, Schecter et al. (2007) found that 53 percent of users clicked through the SSL 
warnings displayed on their banking site. Sunshine et al. (2009) and Sotirakopoulos et al. (2011) found 
similarly high click-through rates.  
However, evidence shows that security warnings are improving partly by addressing the criticisms of 
previous studies (Egelman et al. 2008). For example, Akhawe and Felt (2013) performed a large field 
study, which found that users only clicked through 9 and 23 percent of Firefox and Chrome malware and 
phishing warnings, respectively. However, the results were less positive for SSL warnings: Firefox users 
clicked through 33 percent, and Chrome users clicked through 70 percent. Because of the large disparity 
in results by warning design, Akhawe and Felt called more research that pays “attention to improving 
security warnings” (2013, p. 14). 
Habituation—A Key Contributor to the Failure of Warnings 
Research suggests that warnings may fail to achieve their intended purpose because of a number of 
reasons, including environmental stimuli, interference, failure of warnings to grab or sustain attention, 
and lack of understanding or capability of warning recipients (Wogalter 2006c, Cranor 2008). However, a 
major contributor to warning failure is habituation, which is characterized by automatic responses 
regardless of changes to the context or content of the warning message as a result of repeated exposure to 
warnings (Kalsher and Williams 2006). Furthermore, the habituation process can be accelerated if no 
negative consequence is experienced when a warning is ignored (Vredenburgh and Zackowitz 2006). 
A number of laboratory experiments have pointed to the role of habituation in the failure of warnings 
(Schechter et al. 2007; Sharek et al. 2008). Egelman et al. (2008) found a significant correlation between 
recognition and disregard of security warnings. Sunshine et al. (2009) observed that participants 
remembered their responses to previous security warnings and applied them to other websites even if the 
level of risk involved had changed.  
These laboratory study results are mirrored by those in the field. Akhawe and Felt found that in 
approximately 50 percent of SSL warnings, users decided to click through in 1.7 seconds or less, a finding 
that “is consistent with the theory of warning fatigue” (2013, p. 14). Bravo-Lillo et al. (2013) conducted a 
large field experiment using Amazon Mechanical Turk in which users were rapidly exposed to a 
confirmation dialog message. After a period of 2.5 minutes and a median of 54 exposures to the dialog 
message, only 14 percent of the participants recognized a change in the content of the confirmation dialog 
in their control (status quo) condition. 
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Reducing the Effect of Habituation 
Several approaches have been suggested to reduce habituation and thus increase attention to security 
warnings. Wogalter states that, “habituation can occur even with well-designed warnings, but better 
designed warnings with salient features can slow the habituation process. Where feasible, changing the 
warning’s appearance may be useful in reinvigorating attention switch previously lost because of 
habituation” (2006b, p. 55).  
In line with this reasoning, Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007) proposed polymorphic warnings, 
which change the form of user inputs to prevent habituation. While acknowledging that the design space 
for polymorphic warnings is immense, they only considered two examples of polymorphism: (1) 
randomizing the order in which options are displayed on a warning and (2) disabling the option that 
bypasses the warning for a period of time. They found in a laboratory experiment that those who received 
polymorphic warnings opened risky e-mail attachments significantly less than those who received 
conventional warnings.  
Bravo-Lillo et al. (2013) took a different approach to reduce habituation to security warnings. Following 
design guidelines found in the warning literature, the researchers designed and tested a variety of warning 
attractors, which are manipulations of the user interface to draw attention to salient information in the 
warning dialogs. While the attractors are not polymorphic, the study demonstrated that habituation can 
be reduced through user interface design. 
Research Gaps 
From the above-mentioned review, several gaps in our understanding of users’ responses to security 
warnings are apparent. First, although several of the above studies implied habituation as a factor in 
users’ disregard for security warnings, only Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007) and Bravo-Lillo et 
al. (2013) specifically examined habituation in the context of security warnings. As a consequence, we still 
have much to learn about the extent to which habituation affects users’ responses to security warnings. 
Automatic responses account for a large portion of human behavior in general (Wood and Neal 2007) and 
systems usage in particular (Kim et al. 2005), so their impact is likely to be considerable.  
Second and most important, the studies of Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007) and Bravo-Lillo et 
al. (2013) did not directly measure habituation as a mental state but rather indirectly measured 
habituation by observing users’ responses to warnings. Therefore, measuring the occurrence of 
habituation in the brain presents a good opportunity to quantify the antecedents, onset, and impacts of 
habituation on security warning behavior. With this object in mind, we next review the application of 
decision neuroscience to the study of behavioral information security. 
NeuroIS and Behavioral Information Security 
As the field of behavioral information security matures, understanding why a particular behavior happens 
and not simply that it does happen become increasingly necessary. To this end, decision neuroscience 
offers a promising approach to investigate the effectiveness of security (Crossler et al. 2013). Specific to 
this research, the neural bases for human cognitive processes can offer new insights into the complex 
interaction between information processing in HCI and decision making (Dimoka et al. 2012).  
Whereas HCI researchers have historically relied on surrogates of cognition, such as keyboard and mouse 
movements, neuroscience allows researchers to open the “black box” of cognition by directly observing 
the brain (Benbasat et al. 2010). Neuroscience holds promise for “providing a richer account of user 
cognition than that which is obtained from any other source, including the user himself” (Minnery and 
Fine 2009, p. 73). The ultimate promise of applying neuroscience to behavioral information security is to 
use insights from the study of the brain to design effective user interfaces that can help users make 
informed decisions (Mach et al. 2010; Riedl et al. 2010). 
A method of choice in decision neuroscience is fMRI because of its superior ability to identify areas of the 
brain that are activated during decision making and other behavioral tasks (Dimoka 2012). This 
phenomenon is possible because neural activity requires additional oxygenation through increased blood 
flow, a process called the hemodynamic response. By measuring changes in blood flow to different brain 
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regions, researchers can identify distinct regions of the brain that are correlated with specific emotions 
(e.g., fear or uncertainty) and types of cognitive processing (e.g., perception or memory recall). Thus, 
fMRI is well suited to the investigation of how the RS effect influences habituation and security warning 
disregard. 
Repetition Suppression in the Brain 
The neural underpinnings of habituation have been well studied in the context of simple behavior in 
model organisms. For example, Eric Kandel and colleagues demonstrated in a series of now-classic 
studies using sea slugs that neural responses to a given stimulus decreased with repeated exposures to 
that stimulus (Kandel 2001). This kind of RS to repeated stimuli has also been observed in humans (for 
review, see Grill-Spector et al. 2006). For example, using fMRI, researchers have observed activation 
decreases for repeated stimuli at delays ranging from seconds to days (van Turennout et al. 2000). 
Despite the robustness of the findings of RS, debate continues on the neural and cognitive reasons for 
reduced neural responses to repeated stimuli and how these relate to long-term behavioral habituation.  
The exact cause and purpose of RS may vary according to brain region. In the visual processing system, 
RS appears to be related to repetition priming and may reflect the facilitation of stimulus processing with 
repeated exposures (Desimone 1996). This type of response is highly influenced by the similarity of the 
repeated stimuli, with a more robust RS associated with more similar stimuli (Lueschow et al. 1994). In 
anterior regions, including the perirhinal cortex, RS appears to be independent of the exact stimulus 
features and may instead reflect processes related to semantic priming (Heusser et al. 2013).  
In our own research, we have taken advantage of the RS effect to examine memory specificity mechanisms 
in the medial temporal lobe. Figure 1 depicts the results from one study in this line of investigation. 
 
Figure 1.  Repetition Suppression Effect Observed in the Hippocampal CA3 and Dentate 
Gyrus 
 
Consistent with the predictions of computational models of the medial temporal lobe, we found RS for 
repeated images (white bars) compared with novel stimuli (black bars). We also observed that early 
regions of the hippocampus (dentate gyrus/CA3) did not exhibit RS for similar lure stimuli (gray bars), 
whereas later stages (CA1) exhibited RS for similar lures and true repeats alike (Bakker et al. 2008). We 
have since demonstrated that the hippocampus differentiates subtle changes to stimuli (in this case, 
stimuli that were rotated by 15°) even when participants’ behavioral responses indicated that they were 
unaware of the change (Motley and Kirwan 2012). This finding indicated that neural measures can be 
more sensitive than behavioral measures to RS effects.  
Therefore, our work and that of others (e.g., Lacy et al. 2011; Yassa et al. 2010) have demonstrated that RS 
effects are an effective way to assess the underlying neural computational processes of behavior. In this 
study, we utilized the differential RS effect in various brain regions to map out how sensitive different 
brain regions are to stimulus repetition. 
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Hypothesis Development 
Based on what we know about the robustness and wide applicability of RS, we expect that RS will be 
evident in our fMRI scans, as evidenced by the diminishing of the blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) 
response as stimuli are repeated during the experiment. Specifically, given the large literature on RS in 
visual processing pathways for repeated visual stimuli (Grill-Spector et al. 2006), we hypothesize that: 
H1: For images of general software and warnings, regions associated with visual processing, such 
as the occipital lobe and ventral visual pathway, will exhibit a diminishing BOLD response upon 
successive viewings. 
As participants repeatedly view images they are likely to engage the default mode network; a network of 
regions that have been shown to be more active when participants engage in undirected thought (i.e., 
mind wandering) as in resting baseline periods than when actively engaged in a cognitive task (Mason et 
al., 2007). The default mode network (DMN) includes regions in medial parietal lobe, the inferior parietal 
lobule, and medial prefrontal cortex. In our paradigm, participants will be increasingly likely to engage in 
undirected thought as the stimuli are repeated and, thus, engage the DMN with repeated viewings of 
images. The repetition will cause mind wandering, inattention, or boredom, which will increase with each 
exposure. We hypothesize that: 
H2: For images of general software applications and warnings, the BOLD response will increase 
in regions associated with inattention (the DMN) upon repeated exposure to each image. 
Finally, we hypothesized that brain regions associated with fear or anxiety would be more active for 
security warnings than for general software application screenshots, but that both stimulus types would 
show habituation and decreases in activation with repeated exposure. Specifically, previous studies have 
demonstrated that the anterior insula is associated with fear conditioning and anxiety (Grupe and 
Nitschke, 2013). Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
H3: There will be differences in the BOLD responses between the static images of general 
software applications and the warning images in regions associated with fear or anxiety, such as 
the anterior insula. 
Methodology 
Background of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) capitalizes on the BOLD effect in which the ratio of 
oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin increases as a brain area becomes active. Functional MRI uses 
the same equipment as clinical MRIs and is equally noninvasive. FMRI measures activity in the whole 
brain in a grid comprised of 3-dimensional pixels (or voxels) that are 3 mm to a side approximately every 
2 sec1.  We used fMRI to track activation across the whole brain in response to repeated stimuli, with a 
special focus on regions that are known to show RS effects, such as the ventral visual processing stream 
and the basal ganglia.  
Because of its superior spatial resolution, fMRI has often been used to determine the brain regions 
involved in specific cognitive functions. In addition to this mapping of function to structure, fMRI also 
allows researchers to examine the pattern of activation across different conditions to determine how a 
brain region is involved in specific cognitive functions. 
                                                             
1 The interested reader can find a detailed explanation about how fMRI works at Dimoka (2012). 
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Experimental Design 
To test these hypotheses, we used an experimental design in which participants viewed static images of 
general software application screenshots as well as common security warning images, such as malware 
and SSL warnings because they are so common (Sunshine et al. 2009; Akhawe and Felt 2013). Similarly, 
we are selecting installation dialogs because they are familiar to users (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2013). We 
followed the specific guidelines set forth by Desmond and Glover (2002) to calculate the required number 
of subjects to ensure adequate statistical power. 
A total of 24 undergraduate and graduate students were recruited to take part in the study. Participants 
were required to complete a pre-screening form to ensure the absence of any ferrous objects in the body. 
They were given a verbal briefing about the MRI procedures and the task, and then situated in the 
scanner. We first performed a 10-second localizer scan, followed by the 7-minute structural scan. 
Following those, we started the experimental task. We used ePrime to display the stimuli and synchronize 
the display events and scanner software. 
Participants were shown images for three seconds each, with 0.5 seconds in between (see Figure 2). They 
were asked to use the button-box to indicate if the image shown was (1) common or (2) uncommon. There 
were three bins of images. The first bin contained general software application screenshots (email, 
PowerPoint, Word, Excel, etc.). The second bin contained common security warning images, such as 
software update, browser malware warning, backup prompt, etc.  The third bin was also general software 
application screenshots. The images in bin 1 and bin 2 were each repeated 6 times, and the third bin 
images were shown only once. Stimulus order and spacing were determined with a genetic algorithm for 
design optimization (Wager and Nichols 2003).  
The task was divided into two blocks of almost eight minutes each, to make it easier for the subjects to 
remain still for the duration of the block. Participants were instructed to make a button press on a 
“magnetic resonance”-compatible keypad to indicate whether they thought the image displayed was 
common or uncommon to their personal experience. The purpose of this task was to keep subjects 
engaged in the experiment and paying attention. Although the screenshots and fMRI setting provide low 
ecological validity (Sotirakopoulos et al. 2011), it nonetheless provides a baseline to determine how and 
when RS occurs. 
Examples of general 
software 
 
Microsoft Word 
 
Windows Explorer 
Examples of security 
warnings 
 
Windows User Account Control 
Warning 
 
Java Applet Security Warning 
Figure 1. Example images displayed during the experimental task of Study 1 
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MRI Procedures 
MRI scanning took place at the BYU MRI Research Facility with the use of a Siemens 3T Tim-Trio 
scanner. For each scanned subject, we collected a high-resolution structural MRI scan for functional 
localization in addition to a series of functional scans to track brain activity during the performance of the 
various tasks. Structural images were acquired with a T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid 
acquisition with gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence with the following parameters: TE = 2.26 ms, flip 
angle = 9°, slices = 176, slice thickness = 1.0 mm, matrix size = 256 × 215, voxel size = 1 mm × 0.98 mm × 
0.98 mm. Functional scans were acquired with a gradient-echo, echo-planar, T2*-weighted pulse 
sequence with the following parameters: TR = 2000 ms, TE = 28 ms, flip angle = 90°, slices = 40, slice 
thickness = 4.0 mm (no skip), matrix size = 64 × 64, voxel size = 3.44 mm × 3.44 mm × 3mm. The first 
two subjects were used to pilot test the experimental procedure. With minor adjustments to the 
experimental protocol, we proceeded with the main data collection. Thus the final N was 22. 
Results 
MRI data was analyzed with the Analysis of Functional Images (AFNI) suite of programs (Cox 1996). 
Briefly, functional data was slice-time corrected to account for differences in acquisition time for different 
slices of each volume; then, each volume was registered with the middle volume of each run to account for 
low-frequency motion. Data from each run was aligned to the run nearest in time to the acquisition of the 
structural scan. Data was blurred with a 5 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The structural scan was then co-
registered to the functional scans. As in our previous studies (e.g., Motley and Kirwan 2012), spatial 
normalization was accomplished by first warping the structural scan to the Talairach atlas (Talairach and 
Tournoux 1988) followed by warping to a template brain with Advanced Neuroimaging Tools (ANTs). 
Behavioral vectors were created that coded for stimulus type (security warnings, general software 
application screenshots) and repetition number and entered into single subjects regression analyses. 
Stimulus events were modeled using a stick function convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response. Regressors coding for motion and scanner drift were also entered into the model as nuisance 
variables. Resulting beta values for the conditions of interest were then entered into group-level analyses, 
such as ANOVAs or t-tests, which were used to determine functional regions of interest (ROIs). 
Functionally defined ROIs were then interrogated for differences between conditions, such as the RS 
effect. These results are presented in Table 1. 
The conditions of interest in this study are (1) the three different types of stimuli (security warnings and, 
for comparison, repeated general software application screenshots and novel general software application 
screenshots) and (2) the order of presentation. Accordingly, we performed whole brain analyses using a 
two-way ANOVA with stimulus type and presentation number (1-6) as fixed factors. Brain regions that 
demonstrate main effects or an interaction between these factors were interrogated with planned 
contrasts to determine if they display RS with repeated exposures and if their activity distinguishes 
between different types of warnings. Given previous literature (e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 2006), we 
expected the largest RS effect between the first and second presentation of repeated images. Accordingly, 
we performed a t-test between these two repetition conditions and interrogated regions where there was a 
significant activation difference from the first to the second presentation. 
Within these regions, we observed distinct patterns of activation over the course of repetitions. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, activation decreased from the first to second presentation and then continued to 
decrease linearly in regions that associated with visual processing, such as the occipital lobe and inferior 
temporal lobe (Figure 3 A–B). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, activity in regions associated with the DMN, 
such as the medial parietal cortex and inferior parietal lobule, increased with subsequent presentations 
(Figure 3 C–D). This pattern of activation has been associated with inattention with repeated exposures to 
stimuli (Mason et al. 2007). 
We next examined activation in regions that demonstrated a main effect of stimulus type (general 
software applications or security warning screenshots). We observed a large cluster of activation in the 
bilateral visual stream (see Figure 4), presumably because the software application images were larger 
than the warning images. Outside the visual processing stream, several regions had greater activation for 
the warning images than the general software application images, including clusters in bilateral anterior 
insula. Coordinates and characteristics of the significant clusters of activation are listed in Table 1. 
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Consistent with Hypothesis 3, activation in the anterior insula, associated with fear conditioning and 
anxiety disorders, was more prominent for images of security warnings than for general software 
applications (left linear contrast: F(1,21) = 10.59, p < 0.01). This finding is consistent with an RS effect of 
the fear or anxiety response invoked by warning images. 
 
Figure 3.  fMRI activation differences between first (warm colors) 
and second (cool colors) stimulus presentations. Activation in 
visual processing regions, such as the right occipital/inferior 
temporal lobe (A & B), decreased from first to second 
presentation, while activation increased in regions associated with 
the default network, such as the medial parietal cortex (C & D) 
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Figure 4.  fMRI activation associated with general software application images 
(warm colors) versus security warning images (cool colors) 
 
 
Table 1. Analysis results for general business vs. warning images   
 #Voxels X Y Z 
Main Effect 
Stimulus 
Main Effect 
Repetition 
General > Warning 
    
F(1,21) p F(5,105) p 
B. Occipital/Posterior 
Parietal/Inferior Temporal Cortex 
4577 2 -83 -1 157.41 <.001 3.80 .05 
B. Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex 176 -5 44 -7 29.27 <.001 1.38 .24 
R. Middle Temporal Gyrus 24 56 -8 -13 51.37 <.001 1.59 .21 
Warning > General 
        
L. Middle Temporal Gyrus 380 -59 -38 6 64.64 <.001 2.87 .09 
L. Anterior Insula 359 -50 17 -1 115.00 <.001 6.85 <.05 
B. Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex 141 -2 14 48 40.33 <.001 7.85 <.01 
L. Posterior Lingual Gyrus 66 -23 -95 -4 39.08 <.001 1.82 .18 
R. Anterior Insula 66 41 20 -7 40.99 <.001 0.84 .36 
L. Superior Parietal Lobule 33 -35 -59 51 26.69 <.001 0.74 .39 
R. Posterior Lingual Gyrus 29 20 -98 -7 24.56 <.001 3.18 .08 
L. Middle Frontal Gyrus 29 -44 11 51 31.60 <.001 1.20 .28 
L. Fusiform Gyrus 21 -41 -47 -22 34.25 <.001 5.13 <.05 
Discussion 
This study makes several contributions. First, we extend previous research on habituation by using 
neuroscience to open the “black box” of the brain to observe habituation as it occurs. By doing so, we 
identify the phenomenon of repetition suppression (RS) as a neurobiological explanation for why 
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habituation occurs. Further, we locate specific regions of the brain that exhibit RS in response to repeated 
exposure to security warnings. Interestingly, our results reveal a neurobiological heuristic—with repeated 
exposure to screenshots, the brain conserves energy by expending less effort in visually processing the 
image (as exhibited by the BOLD response in the occipital lobe). Although users are frequently cited by 
security researchers as careless and inattentive (Herley 2009), our results show that this is not necessarily 
the case. At least part of this behavior is obligatory and unconscious as a natural consequence of how our 
brains work.  
This finding has important implications for developing interventions to reduce habituation to security 
warnings. Whereas interventions like security education, training and awareness (SETA) programs that 
encourage greater attention and vigilance are commonly prescribed (e.g., Karjalainen and Siponen, 2011), 
our results suggest that such approaches are incomplete. In addition, interventions should be developed 
to take into account the RS effect and how its impact can be reduced. 
Second, this study demonstrates how the RS effect can be directly measured in the brain using fMRI. 
Whereas previous research measured habituation indirectly by observing its effects, such as inattentive 
behaviors (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2013), this study measures habituation directly as it occurs in the brain. 
Specially, we show how using a simple repeated exposure experimental design, researchers can detect the 
existence and size of the RS effect using the BOLD response. Using this method, we illustrate the 
precipitous drop in visual processing after only one repeated exposure, and a large overall drop after six 
exposures. These results, graphically depicted in Figures 6 and 7, can provide researchers with a useful 
baseline of the RS effect in response to security warnings for future research. Additionally, these measures 
may be used to guide the development and testing of security warnings that are resistant to habituation 
and thus lead to more secure behavior.  
Tellingly, we did not discover a “floor” for RS in response to security warnings, suggesting that attention 
could have dropped even lower in our experiment with more repeated exposures to security warnings. 
These results are sobering when we consider that the typical user is exposed to security notification 
messages on a regular basis. Over the course of weeks or months the impact of the RS effect on 
habituation to security warnings is likely to be profound. 
Third, we also compared how the RS effect differs for screenshots of security warnings vis-à-vis those of 
general software applications. This was an important examination because it revealed how habituation is 
different for security warnings as compared to other phenomena, such as general software applications. 
We found that while the rate of decline of visual attention is similar for both types of images, we found 
that the general software application screenshots elicited significantly higher activity in the occipital 
regions, even after controlling for image size dimensions. Although there was some variability in the 
image richness (graphics, colors, etc.), the images were realistic and representative of current computing 
images. We explain this finding by pointing out the intrinsic differences between general software 
applications and security warnings. Software applications, such as Microsoft Word or Mozilla Firefox, are 
used to accomplish tasks such as a creating a document or browsing the Web. These applications are 
therefore sources of utility and/or pleasure, and offer a wide range of possible uses. In contrast, security 
warnings are typically unsolicited, interruptive, and inhibitive. In addition, they tend to be sparse in 
informational and visual content, and are often difficult for users to decipher (Herley 2009). All of these 
factors should make screenshots of security warnings comparatively less engaging than those of general 
software applications. This implies the task of remediating habituation is even more difficult in the case of 
security warnings, part of what Bravo-Lillo et al. call an “unfortunate starting point” (2013, p. 1). Again, 
the comparative results of the RS effect for both general software applications and security warnings can 
serve as a baseline for habituation research in the future. 
Finally, our findings demonstrate the usefulness of applying NeuroIS to the domain of behavioral 
information security (Crossler et al. 2013). Because automatic or unconscious mental processes underlie 
much of human cognition and decision making (Dimoka et al. 2011), they likely plays an important role in 
a number of other security behaviors, such as SETA programs, password use, and information security 
policy compliance. NeuroIS has the potential to lead to the development of more complete behavioral 
security theories and guide the design of more effective security interventions (Dimoka et al., 2012). 
Therefore, our research points to promising new research directions for behavioral information security. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations 
Like all methods, fMRI poses some inherent limitations and idiosyncrasies. For example, the nature of the 
full-body the fMRI scanner requires that participants lie on their backs and remain still throughout the 
duration of the experiment. These and other constraints introduce artificiality into the study that could 
limit the external validity of the results. Consequently, it is desirable to replicate fMRI experiments in 
more traditional settings in order to compare the corresponding behavioral results to those of fMRI 
experiments (Dimoka 2012). Future research may conduct behavioral experiments in a traditional 
laboratory setting to increase the external validity of our fMRI results. 
Although the sample size of this study (N = 22) might appear to be a limitation, this number is typical for 
fMRI studies which usually consist of between 10 and 20 subjects (Dimoka 2012). Additionally, each 
subject contributes thousands of voxels used in the data analysis. This, in addition to our within-subjects 
design, indicates that an N of 22 provided more than sufficient statistical power for our analyses. 
Directions for Future Research 
Our research points out that an effective route to reducing habituation to warnings would be to develop 
UI designs that target the RS in the brain. In this regard, NeuroIS methods such as fMRI hold great 
potential to guide the design process of interventions (Dimoka et al. 2012). Consequently, future fMRI 
experiments could be used to measure the RS effect in response to UI designs.  
For example, one possible UI design, polymorphic warnings, or warnings that change their appearance 
with subsequent exposures, have been suggested as a way to keep warning messages salient in the minds 
of users (Wogalter 2006c). Although polymorphic warnings have been examined in an experimental 
setting before (Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón 2007), only one polymorphic variation was evaluated. 
Further, competing polymorphic designs were not assessed using neurophysiological techniques. In 
addition, one could broaden the ecological validity of the fMRI studies by using live web navigation as a 
part of the fMRI task. 
An additional avenue of future research is to use other neurophysiological tools besides fMRI. For 
example, eye tracking allows researchers to capture eye movement associated with a given image. Eye 
movement can be used as an index of habituation by observing differences in gaze patterns for images 
that are repeatedly viewed (Hannula et al. 2010). Similarly, mouse cursor tracking is able to use precise 
measurements of mouse and touch movements to measure mental processes such as habituation (Welsh 
and Elliott 2004). These and other methods may be able to test more natural and interactive experimental 
designs, allowing a triangulation of results with those of fMRI (Dimoka et al. 2012), as well as observe the 
effects of habituation on behavior. 
Conclusion 
Users’ habituation to security warnings has long been a sore point in the area of information security 
(Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011). In previous research, habituation has been attributed to users’ carelessness, 
inattention, and ineptitude (Herley 2009). In contrast, we demonstrate in this study that habituation is 
largely obligatory and unconscious as a result of how the brain processes familiar visual stimuli. We 
demonstrate that the RS effect occurs with repeated exposure to both screenshots of general software 
applications as well as security warnings. However, the brain activation is lower for screenshots of 
security warnings in all areas of the brain as compared with general software images, indicating that 
security warnings inherently prompt less visual attention.  
This paper responds to the call of Crossler et al. (2013) for behavioral security researchers to apply 
NeuroIS methods to yield fresh insights. A chief implication of our results is that because habituation 
occurs unconsciously at the neurobiological level, interventions designed to encourage greater attention 
and vigilance on the part of users, such as SETA programs, are likely to have limited impact. Our findings 
suggest that a complimentary approach may be to develop UI designs that are less susceptible to 
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habituation. Accordingly, our results support the development of more complete theories of habituation 
and provide a useful measure to guide the design of habituation-resistant security warnings. 
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